Remember when your grandparents funded World War Two by buying war bonds?
They got four percent returns and a world without Nazis (mostly).
Good deal. You're doing the same thing. Except instead of buying bonds to kill Nazis, you're buying bonds to kill diseases.
War bonds, but backwards. The Core Problem: Good Ideas Die in Committee.
Here's your species' fun puzzle: you know how to save millions of lives.
You can measure exactly how many. You have the money. You don't do it.
Not because your politicians are evil. Because your system is built so that: Politicians maximize reelection, status, and
post-office careers, not "humans continuing to exist". Bureaucracies maximize budget and turf, not "speed of cures".
Lobbyists maximize client profits, not "global welfare". You don't fix this with awareness campaigns.
You've been "raising awareness" for decades and everyone is still dying, but they're dying aware, so that's nice.
You don't fix it with white papers. Politicians use white papers to stabilize wobbly tables.
You fix it by changing what self-interest points at. This chapter describes how to legally bribe your politicians into doing
the right thing. Incentive Alignment Bonds (or I.A.B.s): a financial instrument for paying for better governance without
technically paying politicians, giving money to governments, or going to prison.
Your one percent Treaty isn't constrained by physics, biology, or money.
It's constrained by politics, which is like being constrained by your dog's opinion on quantum mechanics, except your dog
can veto legislation. No politician wants to be the one who "cut the military."
Even by one percent. Even if that one percent cures cancer.
The attack ads write themselves: "Senator Johnson voted to WEAKEN AMERICA."
Your system does exactly what it's incentivized to do. It's not broken.
It's working perfectly at the wrong thing. What You Need: Legal Bribery.
Tell every politician on Earth: "Vote for a one percent-style reform.
If your country actually funds it, you get: better parties, better reelection odds, and a Goldman Sachs board seat when
you retire." No backroom deals. No suitcases of cash. Just a standing, public rule: do the objectively good thing, and the
world systematically rewards you. Nobody has to become a better person.
The money just circulates until diseases stop existing. What I.A.B.s Are.
Incentive Alignment Bonds are financial instruments that: Reward investors with returns from public-good funding achieved.
Reward politicians with electoral support and career benefits for voting right.
Fund the actual public good from the policy outcome (self-sustaining).
Not charity (doesn't scale). Not lobbying (slot taken). Not "paying politicians" (illegal, slot also taken).
Incentive Alignment Bonds, or I.A.B.s, make investors and politicians cooperate on public goods by appealing to the only
thing either species responds to: self-interest. You work with the primates you have, not the primates you wish you had.
How I.A.B.s Work (Four Steps). Step 1: Pick a Measurable Outcome.
Measure funding flows, not health outcomes. You can't attribute a cure to any single country's funding.
But you CAN measure: percent of military spending redirected, total dollars contributed, and politician votes on treaty
passage. Health improvements justify the policy. Funding flows are the scoreboard, because that's what politicians actually
control. Step 2: Raise Capital. Investors buy I.A.B.s. Capital sits in a trust.
It pays out if and only if public-good targets are hit. Same structure as green bonds and catastrophe bonds.
Step 3: Reward Your Politicians (Indirectly). When a politician votes for a one percent-style policy and funding actually
flows: Public Good Scores rise (published by independent rating orgs).
Electoral support increases (independent campaigns favor high-scorers).
Post-office opportunities unlock (fellowships, boards, speaking circuits).
No money flows to politicians. What flows is reputation, electoral advantage, and career advancement.
They're getting credit for doing their job. On your planet, this is apparently revolutionary.
Step 4: Watch Self-Interest Do the Rest. Your politicians' utility function is roughly: U equals the probability of reelection,
plus career advancement, plus post-office income, plus legacy.
I.A.B.s make supporting one percent-equivalent policies strictly increase all four terms.
No altruism required. "Maximize personal payoff" and "reduce suffering" become the same action.
You've tricked your leaders into saving lives by making it the selfish thing to do.
The Three-Layer Architecture (How to Not Go to Prison). You cannot legally say "support Bill X.Y.Z.
one two three and get paid." That's bribery. But you can create a system where politicians who support a class of pro-social
policies systematically get more of everything they want. The trick: rule-based, universal, announced in advance.
Layer A: Scoring (Data Only). An independent org assigns each politician a Public Good Score based on: votes for one percent-equivalent
measures, bill sponsorship, blocking harmful reversals, and actual funding flows.
Critical detail: don't tie scores to "The one percent Treaty" specifically.
Define a policy class: "Policies that reallocate at least one percent of military spending into independently governed pragmatic
clinical trials." Any politician supporting *any* matching policy gets credit.
Public, rules-based, non-partisan. Like a credit score for your soul, except useful.
Layer B: Electoral Benefits (Separate Actors). Independent PACs and five oh one c fours commit in advance to favor high-scoring
politicians. N.G.O.s publish rankings. Conferences invite high-scorers.
Awards go to high-scorers. Your politicians love awards even more than they love conferences, which is saying something.
The goal: make the Public Good Score as influential as Moody's credit ratings.
Moody's can downgrade a country and suddenly borrowing costs spike.
Same energy, different metric: "did you vote for policies that measurably reduced human suffering?"
This is exactly how N.R.A. grades already work. Same gun, different target.
Layer C: Post-Office Careers (The Goldman Sachs Board Problem).
After office, your politicians want prestigious jobs. The "revolving door" usually points at whoever paid the most lobbyists.
You can point it somewhere else. Foundations and think tanks establish: "Eligibility for fellowships and advisory roles
requires a Public Good Score above threshold X." Politicians know this rule in advance.
Support reform means W.H.O. boards and Aspen fellowships. Oppose it means explaining at dinner why you voted against curing
diseases. The revolving door, but spinning toward "saved lives.".
Legal Entity Separation. For scoring, a five oh one c three research organization handles metrics, dashboards, and public
data, but cannot support or oppose candidates. For electoral purposes, five oh one c fours, PACs, and Super PACs handle
independent expenditures for high-scorers, but cannot coordinate with candidates.
For post-office careers, foundations and think tanks set eligibility criteria, but cannot condition grants on specific votes.
Three separate entities that definitely don't coordinate but somehow all reward the same behavior.
Your species invented this structure. It's genuinely one of your better ideas, which is a low bar, but still.
Worked Example: How Senator Smith Votes Yes. Abstract mechanisms are great for economists and incomprehensible to everyone
who matters. Here's how I.A.B.s work on an actual human politician (a creature that navigates entirely by self-interest,
like a moth but with a pension). The Scoring System. Each politician gets a Public Good Score based on their voting record:
Increasing the percentage reallocation to the one percent Treaty Fund: a yes vote is plus fifteen, and a no vote is minus
fifteen. Protecting existing funding: a yes vote is plus ten, and a no vote is minus ten.
Expanding the treaty to more countries: a yes vote is plus ten, and a no vote is minus ten.
Cutting funding or the percentage: a yes vote is minus twenty, and a no vote is plus five.
Your score determines what you get: A score of seventy-five or higher results in two million dollars in PAC spending for
you, plus a Tier one post-office career on W.H.O. boards or Aspen fellowships, with an annual income of five hundred thousand
dollars or more. A score of sixty to seventy-four results in five hundred thousand dollars in PAC spending for you, plus
a Tier two post-office career at Brookings, RAND, or university chairs, with an annual income of two hundred thousand to
four hundred thousand dollars. A score of fifty to fifty-nine results in zero PAC spending and a Tier three standard revolving
door career, with an annual income of one hundred fifty thousand to three hundred thousand dollars.
A score of forty to forty-nine results in five hundred thousand dollars in PAC spending for your opponent and a Tier three
career, with an annual income of one hundred fifty thousand to three hundred thousand dollars.
A score below forty results in two million dollars in PAC spending for your opponent and a Tier three career, with an annual
income of one hundred fifty thousand to three hundred thousand dollars.
In short: high scorers get millions in PAC support and access to the best post-office careers.
Low scorers watch that same money go to their opponents. It's like a video game skill tree, except the X.P.
comes from not killing people. The Setup. VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds have raised one billion dollars from investors
who want 272 percent returns. That money has funded: A referendum showing 70 percent of Americans support reallocating 1
percent of military spending to pragmatic clinical trials. A lobbying campaign that's converted several military contractors
(they did the math on their own mortality, and mortality lost).
The Public Good Scoring system described above, tracking every federal legislator.
Senator Smith (R.-Texas) is up for reelection in twenty twenty-six.
The 1 percent Treaty Implementation Act is coming to a vote.
Her current stats: Public Good Score: 45 (below Senate median of 52).
Current probability of reelection: 55 percent. Expected post-office tier: 3.
Expected post-office income: two hundred thousand dollars per year.
The Old Calculus (Without I.A.B.s). Vote Yes: Attack ads: "Smith voted to WEAKEN AMERICA".
Vote No: Safe from military lobby attacks. Vote Yes: Defense contractors fund opponent.
Vote No: Defense contractors fund you. Vote Yes: No immediate upside.
Vote No: Status quo maintained. Vote Yes: Benefits arrive in 10 years.
Vote No: Costs arrive never. Expected utility of No vote: U equals zero point five five times Office plus two hundred thousand
dollars per year times 20 years plus Medium Legacy. Result: Vote no.
Obviously. The New Calculus (With I.A.B.s). If Smith votes YES: Vote Record: plus 15 points (major treaty vote).
New Score: 45 plus 15 equals 60, which jumps to 72 with multiplier for being early supporter.
Probability of reelection: 55 percent jumps to 62 percent (score boost plus five hundred thousand dollars independent support).
Post-office tier: 3 becomes 2 (with path to Tier 1 if she becomes a champion).
Expected post-office income: two hundred thousand dollars becomes three hundred thousand dollars per year.
If Smith votes NO: Vote Record: minus 15 points. New Score: 45 minus 15 equals 30.
Probability of reelection: 55 percent drops to 48 percent (score penalty plus two million dollars goes to opponent).
Post-office tier: Stuck at 3. Attack ads funded: "Smith voted AGAINST the cure your family needs".
The math: That's a plus 14 percentage point swing in reelection odds and plus two million dollars in lifetime post-office
earnings. Result: Vote yes. The math changed. What Actually Happens.
Pre-vote: Smith's staff models the yes vote. Score jumps to 72.
Reelection odds rise 7 points. Lobbying meeting: Military lobby threatens.
But three major contractors already support the treaty (272 percent returns beat 8 percent).
Threat is empty. Campaign finance: Health advocacy Super PACs have committed fifty million dollars nationally.
At score 72, she gets two million dollars. A no vote sends that two million dollars to her opponent.
Constituent mail: 70 percent of Texans voted yes in the referendum.
Voting against that means explaining why you think they're wrong about not wanting to die.
The vote: Smith votes yes. So do 67 others. Treaty passes. Post-Treaty.
The Public Good Score goes from forty-five to seventy-eight.
The probability of reelection moves from fifty-five percent to sixty-eight percent.
Independent support goes from zero to three million dollars.
The post-office tier improves from three to one. Post-office income increases from two hundred thousand dollars per year
to five hundred thousand dollars per year. Every metric jumps: her score nearly doubles, reelection odds climb thirteen
points, she gains three million dollars in independent support, and her post-office income more than doubles.
Smith wins reelection by twelve points. Joins the W.H.O. Advisory Board.
Chairs the Aspen Health Initiative. All because she did math instead of listening to lobbyists.
(Politicians can count. They just need something worth counting.).
The flywheel spins. Each expansion increases the stakes, increases the score differential, makes voting yes even more dominant:
Year one: one percent treaty, twenty-seven point two billion dollars in revenue, and a two point seven two billion dollar
bondholder payout. Year three: two percent treaty, fifty-four billion dollars in revenue, and a five point four billion
dollar bondholder payout. Year five: five percent treaty, one hundred thirty-five billion dollars in revenue, and a thirteen
point five billion dollar bondholder payout. Why This Isn't Bribery.
Four reasons your lawyers will stop hyperventilating: No one is paid to break a duty; telling a politician "do your job
better and we'll tell everyone you did" is a performance review, not a bribe.
Rules are universal and announced publicly in advance for all parties, meaning no envelopes in parking garages.
No money goes to politicians, who instead benefit indirectly through better scores, electoral support, and nicer career
options. Scores are based on verifiable public voting records, where the ten percent fund flows automatically based on treasury
inflows. Bribery CORRUPTS alignment. Incentive Alignment Bonds, or I.A.B.s, CREATE it.
The Revenue Split. Incentive Alignment Bonds raise the capital and align the politicians.
Treaty revenue splits three ways: ten percent to investors (two point seven two billion dollars), ten percent to political
incentives (two point seven two billion dollars), and eighty percent to the part that actually cures diseases (twenty-one
point eight billion dollars). Everyone profits from treaty expansion.
This is the rare financial instrument where "everyone profits" isn't a lie.
Why ten percent Goes to Political Incentives. Your one percent treaty is the proof of concept.
The endgame is redirecting *most* of military spending to health.
That doesn't happen automatically. Without sustained political pressure, your treaty stalls at one percent forever, like
every other agreement your species has signed and then quietly forgotten about.
The ten percent allocation creates a political ratchet that only moves one direction: At a one percent treaty level, I.A.B.
political funding is two point seven two billion dollars per year, research funding is twenty-one point eight billion dollars
per year, and politicians are rewarded for passage. At a five percent treaty level, political funding is thirteen point
six billion dollars per year, research funding is one hundred nine billion dollars per year, and the defense industry pivots
to health. At a ten percent treaty level, political funding is twenty-seven point twenty billion dollars per year, research
funding is two hundred eighteen billion dollars per year, and war becomes economically obsolete.
At a fifty percent treaty level, political funding is one hundred thirty-six billion dollars per year, research funding
is one point zero nine trillion dollars per year, resulting in a global transformation.
At a one hundred percent treaty level, political funding is two hundred seventy-two billion dollars per year, research funding
is two point one eight trillion dollars per year, and full redirection is achieved.
The pattern is simple: every expansion multiplies both the political incentive budget and the research funding.
At one percent, political funding starts at a few billion per year.
Scale to ten percent, and it becomes tens of billions. At full redirection, I.A.B.s would fund two hundred seventy billion
dollars per year in political incentives. More than all current global lobbying combined.
"Support pragmatic clinical trials" would become the single most profitable opinion a politician can hold.
That's how you change what politicians believe: make the belief profitable.
Without I.A.B.s: In years one through three, the treaty passes, followed by celebration and champagne.
In years four through seven, the defense lobby regroups, there is no expansion, and the champagne goes flat.
In year sixteen and beyond, the treaty becomes another Paris Agreement, a nice symbol that everyone ignores, and the champagne
was wasted. With I.A.B.s: In years one through three, the treaty passes and politicians are rewarded.
In years four through seven, politicians compete to expand the treaty to two percent.
In years eight through fifteen, there is a five percent treaty and defense contractors pivot.
In year fifty and beyond, full redirection is achieved and disease is solved.
The ten percent isn't a cost. It's the engine. Without it, you get a one-time win.
With it, you get compounding political pressure that makes each expansion easier than the last.
The flywheel explained (for anyone who's never seen a virtuous cycle, which is most of your species): First, the treaty
passes and bondholders get first distributions. Second, D.I.H.
funds trials and breakthroughs start emerging. Third, media covers wins and public awareness explodes.
Fourth, public demands more and politicians face electoral pressure.
Fifth, the treaty percentage increases and revenue scales up dramatically.
Sixth, more cures emerge and the cycle reinforces itself. Seventh, the long-term result is compounding returns and saved
lives, the two things humans want most, finally in the same direction.
Beyond the one percent Treaty. The same architecture works for any global coordination problem where: the public good is
measurable, politicians control the outcome, benefits are diffuse, and costs are concentrated.
That describes most of the problems that could end your civilization, which is a worryingly long list: In the climate domain,
using U.N.F.C.C.C. emissions data, I.A.B.s make it career-optimal to "Vote for emissions cuts".
In the nuclear domain, using S.T.A.R.T. treaty warhead counts, I.A.B.s make it career-optimal to say "I reduced our arsenal".
In the pandemic domain, using W.H.O. Joint External Evaluation, I.A.B.s make it career-optimal to say "I funded preparedness".
Same pattern every time: existing metric, scoring system, electoral support for high-scorers, cushy jobs for leaders who
governed well. See the academic paper if you enjoy equations.
For Investors. The sections above explain why incentive alignment bonds, or I.A.B.s, work.
The sections below explain why you should buy them. If you prefer not dying AND getting rich, keep reading.
The Investor Pitch. A financial instrument that generates massive returns while accidentally curing diseases as a side effect.
Like a hedge fund with a conscience, except the conscience is also profitable.
What you're offering investors: two hundred seventy-two percent, which beats everything except insider trading and certain
federal crimes. The money never stops. No maturity date. Bondholders get paid until the sun explodes or humanity achieves
immortality. Whichever comes first. (Bet on the immortality thing.
That's what the bonds are for.). Calculate Your Numbers for Investors.
Show Them Where the Papers Come From. Current global spending on ending human life: two point seven two trillion dollars
per year. What one percent of that is: one percent equals twenty-seven point two billion dollars per year (enough to cure
most diseases, apparently). What bondholders get: two point seven two billion dollars per year (ten percent of treaty revenue).
What funds political incentives (keeps politicians aligned): two point seven two billion dollars per year.
What actually cures diseases: twenty-one point eight billion dollars per year (eighty percent of treaty revenue).
What countries still have for wars: two point six nine trillion dollars (ninety-nine percent of the original budget).
Investors aren't "taking" money from sick people. Eighty percent goes to cures.
Bondholders get ten percent for having the revolutionary idea of "what if we didn't all die?"
On your planet, this qualifies as innovation. When Math Becomes Obscene.
VICTORY incentive alignment bonds never mature. They just keep paying.
Forever. You calculate lifetime value using the perpetuity formula, which is finance-speak for "money printer that never
stops". Total value equals the annual payment divided by the discount rate.
Even if you're extremely pessimistic. If you are mildly skeptical with a three percent discount, the total lifetime value
is sixty billion dollars, which makes your one billion dollars worth ninety times your money.
If you are pretty skeptical with a five percent discount, the total lifetime value is fifty-four billion dollars, which
makes your one billion dollars worth fifty-four times your money.
If you are very skeptical with a ten percent discount, the total lifetime value is twenty-seven point two billion dollars,
which makes your one billion dollars worth twenty-seven times your money.
Even at a ten percent discount rate (as risky as funding a Mars casino), your one billion dollars becomes worth twenty-seven
point two billion dollars total. For people who skipped the math: You give: one billion dollars.
You get: fifty-four to ninety billion dollars equivalent. Time required: Wait for politicians to do math.
Effort required: Literally none after the initial campaign.
Moral status: Accidentally heroic. This isn't complicated math.
Annual return: two hundred seventy-two percent (sounds fake, isn't).
Lifetime value: fifty-four to ninety times (sounds impossible, is just arithmetic).
Compare: venture capital gets three to five times over seven to ten years (requires picking winners).
Real estate gets two to three times over thirty years (requires being a landlord).
The Medallion Fund gets thirty-nine percent annually (closed to mere mortals).
VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds offer perpetual returns that compound into generational wealth while you sleep.
The perpetual nature isn't a bug. It's the entire point. As long as humans prefer being alive to being dead, the treaty
exists. As long as the treaty exists, you get paid. Security Package and Risk.
Five layers of "you'll get paid": Twenty-seven point two billion dollars plus annual treaty revenue stream (starts year
one if treaty passes). Political entrenchment (treaties are historically hard to repeal once implemented, unlike New Year's
resolutions). Public support (seventy percent plus approval, grows with each cure).
Aligned incentives (everyone profits from cooperation). First-lien position (bondholders get paid before anyone else touches
the money). Two categories of risk (both involving trusting humans, which is historically unwise): Project Risks.
Political Risk: The treaty may fail to pass because politicians conclude that dead constituents are preferable to living
ones who complain. Mitigation: broad bipartisan support, multi-country strategy, no single points of failure.
Execution Risk: The campaign may fail to hit milestones. Mitigation: milestone-gated funding, lean operations, and competent
humans (finding those is itself a risk). Investor-Specific Risks.
Liquidity Risk: Funds locked eighteen to thirty-six months during the campaign phase (roughly how long it takes to convince
politicians that living voters are better than dead ones). Mitigation: secondary market trading after lock-up.
Timeline Risk: Politicians could take longer than projected.
They are famously slow at everything except accepting donations.
The perpetual nature of the bond rewards patience. What This Beats (Everything).
VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds yield two hundred seventy-two percent annually with high risk, lasting forever, but requiring
politicians to act rationally. A savings account yields point five percent with no risk and is available whenever, but loses
to inflation. The S and P five hundred yields ten percent with moderate risk and is boring but responsible.
Real estate yields eight percent with moderate risk over thirty years but requires being a landlord.
Venture capital yields fifteen to twenty-five percent with extreme risk over seven to ten years and requires picking winners.
Hedge funds yield eight to fifteen percent with high risk and lock-ups, plus they require being rich already.
The Medallion Fund yields thirty-nine percent with extreme risk but is closed to mortals.
Investing like Warren Buffett yields twenty percent with moderate risk over sixty years but requires being Warren Buffett.
Fine print: Returns assume the treaty passes. If politicians prefer dead constituents to living ones, you lose your money.
But you'll be too dead from preventable diseases to notice.
Pitch angle: Even accounting for "politicians might choose mass death" risk, this crushes every legal investment on the
table. Investment Thresholds and Term Sheet. Lock-up: twelve to thirty-six months until the treaty passes.
Then perpetual distributions begin, like a dividend that outlives you.
Minimum investment amounts by investor type (your species requires gatekeeping even for saving itself): Institutional investors:
ten million dollars or more per investor. Family offices: five million dollars or more per office.
High net worth individuals: one million dollars or more per person.
Qualified investors: one hundred thousand dollars minimum. (Have lawyers review, this is illustrative only) Interest rate:
zero percent (all returns via revenue share model). Revenue share: ten percent of all treaty inflows.
Term: Perpetual (no maturity date). Payment frequency: Annual distributions.
Default provisions: Transparent reporting, third-party audits.
Transferability: Tradable on secondary market after twelve months.
Governance: Grant bondholder board representation. "This sounds like a Ponzi scheme run by someone who failed math."
"Ponzi schemes pay old investors with new investor money. That's why they collapse.
This pays investors with a share of twenty-seven point two billion dollars in annual revenue.
That revenue comes from redirecting one percent of military budgets via treaty.
The money comes from governments that currently spend it on bombs.
The returns are high because the political risk is high. You're betting politicians will choose prosperity over mass death.
Historically, that's a coin flip at best. It's not a Ponzi scheme.
It's lobbying economics pointed at diseases instead of wars.
Same weapon, different enemy." "Isn't this just rich people buying policy?"
Wealthy actors *already* buy policy. Pharma spends three hundred million dollars per year on lobbying.
Defense contractors spend more. That ship sailed, sank, and was rebuilt.
The question isn't "should money influence policy?" It's "can you point the money at welfare instead of warfare?".
Safeguards: no quid pro quo (standing rules only), universal and ex-ante (same for all parties), no cash to politicians
(indirect benefits only), and the metric is suffering reduced, not interests served.
Honest admission: yes, Incentive Alignment Bond, or I.A.B. funders will have more influence over which public goods get
prioritized. So does the Gates Foundation over malaria. So does anyone with money over anything.
The question is whether the influence is transparent, measurable, and auditable.
I.A.B.s satisfy all three. Most lobbying satisfies zero. "Won't politicians game the metrics?"
Yes. Your politicians game everything. The question is whether gaming the metric is harder than just doing the right thing.
Scoring uses public voting records and verified funding flows.
To game those, you'd have to falsify your own vote (public record) or pretend money moved when it didn't (treasury records
are public). That's orders of magnitude harder to fake than self-reported E.S.G.
compliance, which is the bar your species currently uses. (It is an extremely low bar.).
"What if politicians reverse the policy?" Score decay. Vote to reverse funding and your Public Good Score tanks.
The same mechanism that rewarded you punishes you for backsliding.
"You voted yes once" is worth less than "you defended the funding for five years."
You can't prevent all backsliding, but you can make it career suicide, which is the only kind of death politicians fear.
"What happens when this fails and I lose my billion dollars?"
"If the treaty fails completely, you lose your one billion dollars.
It gets spent on the campaign. Convincing humans to click buttons.
Bribing lobbyists. Building platforms. Paying lawyers to make bribery legal.
This is the primary risk. You're funding a political campaign with a two hundred seventy-two percent payout if it wins.
If it fails completely, you'll probably die of a preventable disease anyway.
You won't be around to complain about the lost money. It's venture capital but for not dying.".
"Is this realistic globally?" Doesn't have to start global.
One or two pilot countries (Portugal, Costa Rica, New Zealand) adopt a limited one percent-style policy.
Funding flows get verified. Leaders get invited to better conferences.
Other countries notice. FOMO takes over. FOMO is the most powerful force in international relations, more powerful than
diplomacy, trade agreements, or nuclear weapons. Credit ratings started as one guy in the eighteen hundreds publishing opinions
about railroad bonds. Now Moody's can tank a country's economy with a press release.
Same scaling path: proof of concept, early movers, FOMO among laggards, new normal.
Your species is remarkably good at copying things that work, once someone else does it first.
"How is this different from just donating to charity?" "Charities give you zero percent returns and a tax deduction.
VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds give you two hundred seventy-two percent returns and generational wealth.
Charity is for people who want to feel good. This is for people who want to get obscenely rich.
Saving humanity is a side effect. You're not donating to cure diseases.
You're investing in curing diseases. It's the most profitable legal thing you can do with a billion dollars.
It's the Louisiana Purchase of pragmatic clinical trials. Except instead of buying land from France, you're buying life
extension from death. And unlike Louisiana, it doesn't flood.
And unlike France, it doesn't surrender.". When they want detailed financials.
"Complete breakdowns available: Financial plan: system architecture.
Full offering docs: email for access. The One-Page Summary That Makes Calculators Weep.
Hand this to investors who can't read more than one page: VICTORY Incentive Alignment Bonds: How to Get Obscenely Rich While
Accidentally Saving Humanity What you get. Returns are two hundred and seventy-two percent annually forever (assuming politicians
don't choose mass death). Duration is perpetual (payments never stop until heat death of universe).
As a side effect, millions of humans continue existing who would otherwise stop.
Priority means you get paid before anyone else touches the money.
The growth path goes from one percent to two percent to five percent plus as diseases get cured and the public demands more.
What could go wrong. Regarding political risk, politicians might prefer dead voters (unlikely but humans are weird).
On execution risk, the campaign could be run incompetently (mitigated by hiring competent humans).
Timeline risk involves an eighteen to thirty-six month lockup while convincing politicians to be smart.
For liquidity risk, your money is frozen during the convincing phase.
The core mechanism is stupid simple. Collect one billion dollars from investors.
Convince politicians that living constituents vote more reliably than dead ones.
Treaty passes. Twenty-seven point two billion dollars flows annually from bombs to cures.
Bondholders get ten percent, politicians get ten percent, research gets eighty percent.
Diseases decline, public demands more, returns scale up. Repeat until death is optional.
Summary. I.A.B.s don't change human nature. Nothing changes human nature.
You've tried religion, philosophy, education, and strongly worded letters.
None of it worked. I.A.B.s just redirect the nature you've got.
Legal (three-layer architecture, no money to officials). Scalable (one country, then FOMO).
Self-reinforcing (each expansion funds the next expansion).
You're not asking your politicians to be saints. Saints don't run for office.
You're making "save millions of lives" and "advance my career" the same sentence.
The rest is gravity.